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I WO of the most noteworthy developments in
the U.S. economy during this decade have been the
sharp rise in energy prices in 1973-74 and the sluggish
pace of business investment during the brisk eco-
nomic expansion which followed the 1974-75 reces-
sion. The purpose of this article is to delineate the
connection between these two developments. The
analysis presented provides a perspective on the be-
havior of business investment spending in the recent
past, and the general effects of energy price changes
on investment and productivity.1
A standard view of the investment decision is that
a profit-maximizing finn determines whether or not
to invest in an asset by comparing the purchase price
of the asset to the present value of the additional net
receipts obtained over the life of the asset. The firm
will invest whenever the purchase price of an asset
is smaller than the present value of net receipts. At
This article draws upon the author’s paper “The New Energy
Regime and Investment” (unpublished) which was prepared
for a Federal Reserve Board of Governors study on Capital
Formation. The author is grateful for the comments on the
earlier paper by Nancy Ammon Jianakoplos, Patrick Lawler,
and Robert H. Rasche,
1
There are many factors which may have adversely affected
business investment in plant and equipment in the recent
past, such as safety and pollution regulations, inflation, large
fiscal deficits, and increased uncertainty, The significant com-
mon feature of these developments is that they existed to some
extent since the mid-sixties but, prior to 1974, did not seem
to exert the profound influence required to explain recent de-
velopments. These other factors are ignored below.
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the margin, the present value of the net receipts
attributed to the purchase and use of the asset will
be equal to its purchase price or replacement cost.
A rise in the price of energy resources generally
reduces the incentive for firms to use and, therefore,
to invest in plant and equipment. The net receipts ex-
pected from the asset in future periods are reduced
by an amount equal to the higher energy costs, other
things remaining the same. This, however, ignores
such factors as product prices, the price of capital
goods, and other resource employment, which also af-
fect the investment decision and can be expected to
change when energy resources become more expen-
sive. In order to take these factors into account, the
relationship between the purchase price of a capital
asset and the present value of net receipts can be
rearranged to focus upon the production and capital
employment decision.
Since the decision to invest implies that, at the
margin, the price of the capital asset equals the pres-
ent value of the expected net receipts, a “rental price”
can be computed for any capital asset on the basis of
this equality. This rental price is merely the cost per
period of holding and using the capitaL asset and is
directly proportional to the purchase price of capital
goods2. The optimal amount of capital for a firm to
employ can be determined using this price.
2
Generally, the rental price is the periodic cost of the equity
and debt required to hnance the replacement cost of the asset,
the value of the asset lost per period due to depreciation, and
taxes on the revenues from the use of the asset. Since it is
proportional to the purchase price of a capital good, the terms
are used interchangeably below.
Energy Prices and Capital Formation:
1972-1977
JOHN A. TATOMFEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOWS MAY 1979
An additional unit of capital used per period, hold-
ing other resource employment constant, generates
additional output and revenue per period. The prof-
itability of employing additional capital depends upon
a comparison of the additional receipts and the price
of the additional capital. The optimal employment of
cajital occurs when all profitable opportunities which
yield greater net revenues than their associated costs
have been exhausted. Thus, at the margin, the optimal
employment of capital occurs when the value of the
marginal product of capital goods equals the rental
price of capital goods. Such a condition may be writ-
ten as:
(1) P~f~P~
where P~is a given price of product x, f~is the mar-
ginal product of capital goods (the additional output
produced with the addition of a unit of capital, hold-
ing other resources fixed), and P~is the rental price
of capital. A similar relationship holds for the em-
ployment of every other resource used by an econom-
ically efficient finn.
The principle of diminishing returns plays an im-
portant role in the determination of the optimal cap-
ital usage. The use of more plant and equipment
leads to greater output, but successive additions of
capital result in successively smaller additions to out-
put, unless more of other resources are also employed.
Thus, at some point, the additional output generates
additional revenues sufficient to cover only the price
of capital. In short, the value of the marginal product
[designated P,f in equation (1)1 declines as employ-
ment of capital increases, other resources remaining
the same.
An increase in the price of energy resources affects
costs of production and prices throughout the econ-
omy. The unit cost of existing output and the cost of
producing additional output tend to rise in proportion
to the share of total cost attributable to energy re-
sources. Moreover, firms reduce energy use as it be-
comes more expensive relative to output prices.
A reduction of energy use, in turn, reduces the
marginal productivity of other resources. Employment
of a non-energy resource will tend to decline unless
its price relative to the output price (e.g., Prc/Px for
capital) falls proportionately with the decline in its
marginal product, (e.g., f~for capital). Should such
a decline occur, there would be no change in the
optimal employment of the resource, since equation
(1) would hold at the employment rates which were
optimal prior to the energy price boost.
Figure I
The Effect of Higher Energy Prices
on the Desired Stock of Capital
Ki K-, Stock of Copitol
a
It is unlikely, however, that such a decline in the
“real price” of capital (the price of capital relative
to the price of output) would occur for the typical
firm. If the share of energy costs in the production
of capital goods is the same as the average cost share
for all output, then the price of the nation’s capital
goods will rise in the same proportion as the prices of
all other products. The real price of capital goods is
essentially unchanged, while the marginal productiv-
ity of capital goods is lower. Thus, the desired employ-
ment of capital will fall. Investment slows temporar-
ily to adjust the actual stock of capital to the lower
desired amount.
If the production of capital goods uses relatively
more energy than production of other goods, the price
of capital goods rises even more than output prices.
Since the rental price of such goods is directly pro-
portional to the price of the goods, the real rental
price of capital would rise, further reducing both the
desired capital stock and investment.8
The failure of the relative cost of capital to de-
cline provides an incentive for firms to reduce their
desired stock of capital along with energy usage. The
effect on the aggregate desired stock of capital may
be seen in Figure 1, where initially the demand curve
D indicates the aggregate demand for capital at alter-
3
The analysis here can be used to find the inter-industry invest-
ment effects of higher energy prices. These are explored more
fully in Tatom, “The New Energy Regime and Investment.’
Differential adjustments across industries can be expected pri-
marily because the relationship of product prices to the prices
of capital goods is affected differently across industries in
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native prices of capital relative to the price of out-
put, Pu Factors which affect the desired stock of
capital other than the relative cost of its scrvices are
held constant along D. Initially, the economy is as-
sumed to be in equilibrium, given the relative price
of capital p,,, holding the actual capital stock, K0.
A rise in the relative price of energy shifts the de-
mand for capital downward, as less energy is used to
produce output with any given stock of capital and
given flow of labor services.4 In effect, the downward
shift in demand to D’ indicates a decline in the mar-
ginal productivity of capital due to employment of
less energy. If the real price of capital remains at Po,
however, the desired capital stock falls to K1. In the
aggregate, investment declines so as to reduce the
capital stock from K0 to K,.
A rise in the relative price of energy will cause an
initial reduction in output, induced primarily by a
reduction in the use of energy resources. If the price
of capital rises with the price of output, the desired
capital stock is also reduced. Since capital is more
expensive relative to its productivity, firms will
also economize on its use, temporarily reducing
investment.’
it, The Evidence
There are two basic implications of this theory.
First, a rise in the price of energy relative to output
leads to a decline in the productivity of existing cap- hours of employment and the flow of capital services.”
ital and labor resources. Second, aggregate invest- The period studied is 1948-75, hut similar results are
ment will slow temporarily, reflecting a decline in reported for the period prior to the sharp rise in
firms’ desired capital use. energy prices in 1973. A recent estimate of the quar-
terly production function (1/48-11/78) is:






where y is real output in the private business sector,
k is a measure of the flow of capital services [the
product of the Federal Reserve Board capacity utili-
zation rate and the net stock of private nonresiden-
“See Robert H. Rasche and John A. Tatoin, ‘‘Energy Resources
and Potential GNP,” this Review (June 1977), pp. 10-24,
and ‘‘Potential Output and Its Growth Rate — The Doini-
nanee of Higher Energy Costs in the 1970’s,” in U.S. Pro-
dtzction Capacity. F~.sti,i~ating the Utilization Gap ( St. Louis:
Center for the Study of Acneriean Business, Washington
University, Working Paper 23, Deceenher 1977), pp. 67-106.
The first implication has
earlier study which showed
tive price of energy reduces
been supported by an
that a rise in the rela-
output, holding constant
4
At K, along D~the relative price of labor is sufficiently lower
for the quantity of labor to be the same as along D. This as-
sumes that the supply of labor to the cconomy is flxcd and
that the shift downward in the marginal product of labor is
reflected in a decline in the real wage. Whether the supply of
labor is affected by an energy—inde cccl fall in the real Wage
is unclear. So—called income and substitution effects of a real
wage decline may lead to reductions jet labor supply, while an
associated decline in the real value of monetary and physical
wealth tends to increase labor supply. The net effect is as—
sowed to be zero here. Leonall C. Andersen, ‘‘Art Explanatit,n
of Movements in the Labor Force Participation Rate, 1957—
76,” tIns Review (August 1978 1. pp. 7—21, provides evidence
that the permanent net effect arising from the 1974 expe-
rience is zero.
‘The results explained in this section may he derived cesing a
simple aggregate model of output supply acid factor employ-
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Relative Price of Capital Goods
that the price of capital goods relative
to output prices did not fall subsequent
to the energy price increase.
In Chart II, the price of new capital
goods relative to the price of output is
shown for the period 1947—78. It is clear
from the chart that the relative price of
capital goods did not decline subsequent
to the sharp rise in the relative price of
cuerg~in 1973-74. Instead, it increased
until early 1975, and has been fairly
stable since. The rise in the real replace-
inent cost of capital during 1973-74 may
have occurred because the production
of capital goods is relatively more energy
intensive than the production of private
output generally. In this case, the price
of capital goods would rise more than
the average level of output prices
when energy costs rise. The increase
in the real replacement cost of capital
goods further reduces the incentive to
invest.
tial fixed capital], hi smanhours in the private busi-
ness sector, () is the producer price index for fuel,
related products, and power deflated by the private
business sector price deflator, and t is a time trend.
The numbers in parentheses are t—statistics.
The significant negative impact of the relative price
of energy on output per unit of capital indicates the
existence and extent of a productivity loss associated
with a rise ii) the relative price of energy. Chart I
shows that, from the second quarter of 1972 through
the end of 1977. the relative price of energy rose 60
percent (all percentages are measured as first differ-
ences in logarithms). The direct loss in productivity
(measured relative to labor or capital) is 6.5 percent
(60 x .1081) according to the production function
above. Two-thirds of this loss occurred during the
year from the third quarter of 1973 to the thud quar-
ter of 1974, when the relative price of energy rose
40 percent.
The second major implication of the analysis is
that the aggregate desired stock of capital declined
due to the sharp rise in the price of energy relative
to the price of output, and that the recent sluggish
pace of business investment is due, in large part, to
this decline. This result rests upon the assumption
Chart III shosvs quarterly estimates of the net
stock of fixed nonresidential capital from 1948-78.’
The trend rate of growth of the stock of plant and
equipment from 1948 to the first quarter of 1975 is
4.1 perev’nt. As the chart indicates, the rate of growth
slowed markedly during 1975-77. From 1/75 to IV/77,
the animal rate of growth averaged only 2.3 perc’e~t.
Some slowdown in the i-ate of capital accumulation
might he expected due to the prior reeessios and ac-
company-mg lower levels of capacity utilization and
employment from 111/74-1/75. A visual coenparison of
earlier recoveries following the shaded recession peri-
ods in Chart Ill indicates that the recent slou’ing is
unusual compared to prior early expansioiI periods.
‘The estimates ale eonstrncrtetl by intei~)u lating the dCCd of sea
net stock prepared by the U.S. Department of Coisonerce for
the period 1948—75 - The in tc’rpo]atioF F sises dliIarte rlv i-atd’s of
ccinstatit dollar leo)tresieleestial used investlest’ it its the:’ CNi’
ace,snists - as weights in fi,ecli,eg end—of—ctuarter net tap ital
stocks. After 1975, the e’stineatc’s ate based upon the pricer
11/18—IV/75 ) relationship of the rate of tee)oresid’~t t iaI
fixed investment (I, ) and the lagged net capital stock, to
account for depreciation. The equation ( t statistic’s in pa’
rentheses ) is:
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P,’.,,eag,s are a,,,e,I ate, ot‘h,,g, Ban p,,Fode F,dF,oted.




The slowing in capital investment is even more
apparent when viewed relative to the growth of po-
tential private sector employment. Chart IV shows
the historical growth pattern of the capital stock
relative to the high employment supply of workers.
The capital stock in any quarter is measured by the
existing stock at the end of the prior quarter. Poten-
hal private business sector employment is measured
by adjusting the actual labor force, less employment
outside the private sector, for the full-employment
unemployment rate.8 In effect, the employment meas-
ures are estimated under full employment conditions,
Until the thud quarter of 1973, the ratio of available
capital to available labor grew at an annual trend rate
of 2.9 percent. From the third quarter of 1973 until
SThe full-employment m~employment rate series used is that
developed by Peter K. Clark, “Potential GNP in the United
States, 1948-80,” in U.S. Prodnctie,e Capacity: Estimating the
Utilization Gap (St. Louis: Washington University, Center
for the Study of American Business, 1977), pp. 21-86. The
series is constructed to find an unemQloyment rate compa-
rable to four percent in 1955, after adjustment for changes
in the age and sex composition of the labor force.
the end of the recession, the growth rate slowed. Dur-
ing the ensuing expansion, the ratio of capital stock to
potential employment remained virtually unchanged.
Chart III and IV provide illustrations of the slow-
down in capital accumulation implied by the theory
above, and support the claim that this energy-induced
slowdown in capital growth caused a temporary re-
duction in the growth rate of potential output after
1973.~Two questions obviously arise, however. First,
how large is the energy-induced reduction in the
capital-labor ratio, and to what extent has it already
occurred? Second, how large are the energy-induced
output and capital stock reductions along a high-em-
ployment growth path, when the effects of higher
energy prices are aggregatedP The output effects are
(1) the short-run loss in productivity, given capital
9
See Rasche and Tatom, “Potential Output and Its Growth
Rate.” The estimate of the potential growth rate is three
percent from eady 1975 through mid-1977. This slowing
should not be confused with the once-and-for-all decline in
productivity, given capital and labor, implied by the theory
and evident in 1974 productivity developments,
1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1916 1978 1980
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and labor employment in the United States, and
(2) the loss in output due to the long-nm adjustment
to the energy-induced decline in the capital-labor
ratio.’°
These questions may be answered using the esti-
mate of the production function given in equation (2).
The percentage change in output for a one percent
rise in the relative price of energy in the long run
is (~.7),where a and y are the output elasticities
of labor and energy employment, respectively)1 Esti-
~
0
A third effect, dine to an energy-indlnced rise in the relative
price of capital, has not been well substantiated by detailed
ecotiometrie analysis andl so it is not incorporatedl in the
estimates in the text. To the extent such atl effect exists, the
estimates below are too low.
~
1
The production function is y = Ac” h’ k~Ft. where E is
energy and a, ft v, the output elasticities of the respective
thputs which seem to unity. See Rasehe and ‘I atom, “Energy
Resources and Potential CNP” The derivation of the expres-
sion used here follows from mathematical conditions re-
quired for efficient long-run employment nf capital and
mates of a and ‘y, found from the estimated equation
(2), with standard errors are:
(3) & n: 6139 ( 027 1)
= .0976 (.0137)
The short-run capacity loss for each one percent in-
crease in the relative price of energy is found from
the coefficient on the energy price in equation (2),
which is an estimate of (f_Y~.~), or in this case,
—,108l. The total response (-Y) measures the long-
run effect when capital employment adjusts to its
long-run equilibrium, given an unchanged real price
of capital. The estimates in (3) indicate that the long-
run output effect is 40.2 percent larger (—.1516) than
the short-run effect. For the rise in the cost of energy
from mid-1972 through 1977, the short-mn output
energy, given the aggregate supply of labor and the real
rental price of capital. This expressiote andl other lnathemati—
cal results below are derived in the Appendix.
Chore tV
Full-Employment Capital-Labor Ratio in the Private Sector
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loss is 6.5 percent while the long-mn response allow-
ing capital to adjust is 9.1 percent.12
The total effect on the demand for capital may be
found from the condition for profit-maximizing capi-
tal demand, Pk = [3 ~, where (3 is the output elas-
ticity of capital and pa is the price of capital relative
to the price of output. Given Pa and the parameter
[3, the ultimate percentage decline in the desired
capital stock must equal the percentage decline in
output in order to maintain the equality. The elas-
ticity measure for the total output response above
is —.1516. Thus, the 60 percent rise in the rela-
tive price of energy from mid-1972 through 1977
would reduce the capital-labor ratio by 9.1 percent
along its new long-mn growth path.~The decline in
the actual capital-labor ratio relative to its past trend
is 12 percent, when the trend is extrapolated from
mid-1972 through the end of 1977, consistent with
the reduction indicated by energy price considera-
tions alone.
The results indicate the costs associated with the
rise in the relative price of energy from 1972-1977.
In terms of output, the cost of the adjustment by the
end of 1977 was a 9.1 percent reduction, much of
which occurred during the period from 111/73 to
111/74. Most of the loss was due to the direct effect
on productivity of a higher relative cost of energy
and changes in resource allocation, given domestic
capital and labor resources. An estimated 2.6 percent-
age points of the loss in output occurred subsequently,
due to the energy price-induced slowing in capital
formation. The net capital stock at the end of 1977
in the estimates above is $1,031.8 billion (1972 prices),
while the estimates imply it would have been $98.3
12ff the price of capital goods relative to output prices is
affected by the rise in energy prices, then another element
13 din P,
must be added to the long-run output loss (— &ar~p )~
where j3 is the output elasticity of capital. One simple esti-
mate of the price responsiveness, for quarterly data from
1948-77, is .0564 when the logarithm of the relative price
of capital is related to the logarithm of the relative price
of energy and constant, and the equation is estimated using
the Cochrane-Orcutt technique. The addition to the output
-. V
elasttccty (— — = —.1516) is 2.27 percent. Thus, a 60 per-
cent in energy prices would add only about 1.4 percent to
the output loss over the long run.
13
Accounting for the energy price effect on the relative price
of capital would add .0791 to the capital elasticity (in abso-
lute vahie), implying a 13.8 percent reduction in the capital
stock.
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billion larger in the absence of the dramatic change
in energy costs over the preceding five years.14
ill. The Rem..atnine j%.d.75’tn3.Pflt ~intJ.
Recent Devcl.cpinente
Energy prices in world markets have not fully ad-
justed to past OPEC actions because of U.S. energy
policy. Decontrol of the U.S. petroleum market will
complete the adjustment and will further affect future
production.
Since 1973, the primacy component of energy policy
has been the entitlement program. This program was
intended to hold the cost of petroleum to U.S. refiners
below the OPEC price to allow for a longer transition
period to the higher prices. The average cost of crude
oil to refiners at the end of 1977 was about 18 per-
cent below the cost of imported oil)5 An earlier analy-
sis indicates that, based on this difference, the end of
the entitlements program would add about 7.8 per-
cent to the relative price of energy resources.1°This
increase results from a direct effect on the price of
refined products, cost effects on competing energy
producers, and substitution effects among energy
uses. Given the estimates of the short-mn and long-
run impacts of higher energy costs above, it is possi-
ble to assess the output loss in the short and long run
due to this change. In the short run, the output loss
is less than 1 percent. Even allowing for the effects
on the demand for capital, the total long-mn effect
is a loss in output and capital stock of 1.2 percent.
This loss should be regarded as a maximum esti-
mate, had the crude oil market been completely
decontrolled at the end of 1977. The reason is that
such a policy would increase the responsiveness of
world (U.S.) petroleum supplies to the world price,
increasing the elasticity of demand faced by the domi-
nant firm, the OPEC cartel, and putting downward
pressure on their optimal price. Thus, the effect of
lSThis estimate is very close to that by Edward A. Hudson
and Dale W. Jorgenson, “Energy Prices and the U.S. Econ-
only, Natural Resources Journal (October 1978), pp. 877-
97, and Data Resources U.S. Review (September 1978), pp.
1.24-1.37. They estimate that by the end of 1976, the U.S.
capital stock svas $103 billion (1972 prices) lower than it
otherwise would have been due to energy price
developments.
15
This is the percentage excess of the refiner acqtnsition cost
of imported crude oil over the composite cost in late 1977
reported by the Department of Energy, Monthly Energy
Review (August 1978), pp. 58.
16
See Rasche and Tatom, “Potential Output and Its Growth
Rate,” pp. 93-97.
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decontrol on production and investment would have
been slight in the United States.
During 1978, there was little change in the relative
price of energy. Although the pace of capital accumu-
lation increased during the year — the net stock of
capital grew 3.5 percent from the end of 1977 to the
end of 1978 — the capital-labor ratio was virtually
unchanged. During the year, the gap between the
U.S. average cost of crude oil and the world price
narrowed, averaging about 12 percent by the end of
1978. Thus, the implied impact of domestic petroleum
market decontrol was reduced sharply.17
Political developments in the Middle East late in
1978 and early in 1979 led to a sharp disruption inpe-
troleum supplies and subsequently changed the struc-
hire of OPEC supply. Coincident with these develop-
ments, OPEC announced an increase in the cartel
price of crude oil by about 14 percent during 1979.
OPEC later adjusted to supply developments by
hastening the announced increase and by allowing in-
dividual countries to impose additional surcharges
on production. The result has been another round of
boosts in petroleum prices in the world market and,
indirectly, the prices of other sources of energy.
It is tenuous to speculate on the final outcome of
recent developments on the price of OPEC crude oil
and the impact on U.S. energy costs. However, nom-
inal energy prices have risen at a 31 percent annual
rate from November 1978 to May 1979. Based upon
an 8.5 percent rate of increase of the implicit price
deflator for private business sector output from the
fourth quarter of 1978 to the first quarter of 1979, the
relative price of energy has been rising at about a 22
percentannual rate. During the six-month period from
tmTThe estimate of this difference is based upon an imputed
cost of imports and U.S. average cost of all crude oil found
by adding the price of an entitlement to the wellhead price
of lower tier oil, plus twenty-one cents, to find the average
world price. The domestic cost is found by subtracting the
entitlement benefit from import cost. The calculation uses
quarterly averages of monthly figures. The comparable figure
for the fourth quarter of 1977 is 16 percent. Data on the
refiner acquisition cost of imported oil during the fourth
quarter of 1978 is not available at the time of this calcula-
tion. The data and definitions of tenns are from the Monthly
Energy Review (April 1979). A more detailed discussion of
these tenns and the analysis of the entitlement program may
be found in John A. Tatom, “Energy Policy and Prices;’
Business Economics, (January 1979), pp. 14-22.
November to May, the relative price of energy in-
creased about 11 percent, implying a short-run pro-
ductivity loss and price level rise, according to the
estimates above, of 1.2 percentage points. The implied
long-run productivity and capital stock reduction is
1.7 percent.18
IV°~ConcitniOn
The large increase in the cost of energy resources
from 1972 to 1977 has had profound effects on pro-
ductivity, investment, and the long-term growth path
of the U.S. economy. In addition to a direct loss in
productivity of about 6.5 percent, a reduction in the
desired capital-labor ratio has further aggravated pro-
ductivity growth. Since 1975, growth in the capital
stock has barely kept pace with growth in the labor
force available to the private sector. This develop-
ment represents a significant departure from the
trend growth in the capital-labor ratio, a trend which
contributed significantly to overall economic growth
in the United States prior to 1973.
The analysis and estimates here indicate that a drop
of at least 9 percent in the desired capital-labor
ratio is to be expected from the sharp rise in the rela-
tive cost of energy which occurred from mid-1972
through 1977. This represents about three years growth
in capital relative to labor on the pre-1974 trend.
Once such an adjustment is completed, there is no
reason to presume that other forces contributing to
capital formation will be offset by the effects of past
energy price changes. Unfortunately, recent events in
the world petroleum market suggestthat another round
of lesser adjustments of resource allocation, capital
formation, and economic growth will occur before
such forces again dominate the scene.
isof course, these increases do not fully reflect OPEC actions
as existing policy insulates U.S. energy prices from OPEC
actions. Thus, recent energy price increases in the United
States (and their effects) are only about half as large as they
would have been otherwise. The remainder of the increase
will he phased in over the next eighteen months under the
administration’s decontrol proposal. It would be erroneous to
conclude that these developments increase the cost to U.S.
consumers of a decontrol program, since decontrol yields pos-
itive net benefits to U.S. consumers. The adverse impacts as-
sociated with such a program are indeed larger, but the net
benefit to consumers of decontrol is correspondingly larger.
See Tatom, “Energy Policy and Prices.”
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The results discussed in this paper may be demonstrated
using a simple model of aggregate production. Consider a
general aggregate production function with tIle assumption
of profit-maximization and the most general assumptions
for short- and long-run resource constraints. Assume that
aggregate output, ~‘, depends upon the use of labor (h),
capital (k), and energy (e), y = f (h, k, e), given tech-
nology. The short run is characterized by fixed supplies of
labor and capital resources (h°,k’) arsd by a given relative
price of energy s-esources, p~,detennined in the svorld mar-
ket. In the long run, the supply of capital is variable as firms
can add to or subtract from the stock of capital depending
on their incentives. The relative price of capital (measured
relative to the price of output) is assumed to be given in
the long run. The long-run supply of labor and relative
price of energy are assumed to be the same as in the
short run (h’, ps).
The profit-maximizing choice of an input is determined
by equaling the marginal cost (price) of the resource to
the value of its marginal product, f1
= p,, where f1 is the
Table I
A Simple Model of Aggregate Supply
and Resource Markets
Production Function- y f(h k e)
Fir t Orde Condition For
Profit Ma mization —
k f
p
Short run B source St pp A umption b h
kk
pp
Long r Resourc Suppl As u ptions, h -c h
p —p”
P’ Pe




p wage of labor relati to th price of
output
p rental pn’ of capital relativeto the
pr c of output
p pm-ice of n rgy refntiv to thep ce of
outpu
marginal productivity of resource i ( ~- ) and p’ is the
rental price of the resource relative to the price of aggre-
gate output. The production function, profit-maximizing
demand for each of the three imipnts, and the three supply
equations which hold in the short rtln or the long run can
be used to determine output and employment of each re-
source as well as their relative prices. The short-run and
long-run models are shown in Table I. By differentiating
each system of equations, the short-run and long-run re-
sponse to a rise in the relative price of energy may be
found to be those indicated in Table II.
The critical unknown determinant of the effects shown
in Table II is the sign of f11 for i, j = k, h, e. This tenn
indicates the effect of an increase in the employment
0
f
factor j on the marginal productivity of a resource i. The
typical response is positive; employment of more of one
resource is generally responsible for increased marginal
productivity of the other resources.tm The generality of the
results in Table II indicates the importance of the sign of
f5~.The signs of f,,0, ~kk,~ are assumed to he negative,
indicating diminishing returns to the employment of each
resource.
The short-mn output effect discussed in the text rests
upon the assumptions of a positive marginal product of
energy and diminishing returns to the employment of
energy resources, given capital and labor. The effect arises
solely due to the reduction of energy employment, given
the assumptions concerning the supply oflabor and capital.
Under the assumption that energy resources augment the
marginal productivity of capital and labor, the real rental
price of capital and labor must fall to maintain their em-
APPENDIX




is positive in the three factor Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function where the resources are substitutes, or oij
> 0. The term f,
5
is also positive if o,~< 0, or the resources
are complements. The determinant of the negative capital
stock effect can he referred to as “q-complementarity’ which
must be the case if o,~< 0 and will be the case for Cobb-
Douglas and CES production functions where ~ > 0, or
resources are ‘p-substitntes. On this tenninology and these
relationships, see John B. Hicks, “Elasticity of Substitution
Again: Substitutes and Complements,” Oxfom’d Economic
Papers, 22, no. 3 (November 1970), pp. 289-296, and Ryuzo
Sato and Tetsunori Koizumni, “On The Elasticities of Substitu-
tion and Complementarity,” Oxford Economic Papers, 22, no.
1 (March 1973), pp. 44-59. Whether capital and energy are
substitutes or complements (in the “p” sense) is a continuing
controversy. See Emst B. Bemdt and David 0. Wood, “En-
gineering and Econometric Interpretations of Energy-Capital
Cnmnplementarity,” American Economic Review, (June 1979),
pp. 342-354. Fortunately, the issue does not affect the capital
stock—investment result, but it is important for such questions
as short-run output supply effects and changes in the amount
of energy used per unit of capital.
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Table II
The Effect of a Rise in
the Relative Price of Energy
ShortEun Long Run
d fe (ffks—ff ) •




Energy Employment: djy~ ~‘ < ~ D
Belatmve Price of L~ ~ ±!~ ~
Relative Price of dpk fk
Capital Service dp 0 0
DI (f~f~fi) 0.
eSign depends upon f~aud/o f5
0
ployment. If energy employment has no effect on the pro- of neutral technological change (r) over lime (t) is omit-
ductivity of capital and labor, no shift in demand for ted here for simplicity and to avoid notational confusion.
capital and labor occurs. If increases in energy employ- .. yy ay
ment reduced the marginal productivity of labor or The first order conditions are: P0
— -~‘ Pa — “fj~~and P& =
capital, the demand price of the factor would rise.
For the analysis in the text, mt is most convenient to
The long-run effects of a rise in the relative price of k .-
energy are also unambiguous, given that ~ > 0. Not only compute the effects in Table II in elasticst form. Since
are output and energy usage reduced as in the short run, labor and the relative pnce of energy are fixed in the
the empioyment of capital is also reduced. Of course, this short and long run, the production function can convem-
result arises from a temporary reduction in investment to ently be rewritten as:
achieve the smaller amount of capital desired. The results a 13 V
show that the economy will reduce the use of capital goods (2) In y = In A°-4- 117 in h + -j—~-ln k — ‘-y~ In p~
since they have become more expensive in relation to the -
productivity of such goods. Subtracting the long-run out- by substituting the first-order condition for energy employ-
put effect from the short-run effect results in: meut in the production function. Then, given labor and
capital employment, the short-run effect of a rise in the (1) f~(e ~,- 5f,~) .. . dlny y
f0, IDI relative priceof energy is ~—~--“-— — —
which is positive, given that ~aeis positive (f00, D < 0).
Thus, the long-mn output effect of the rise in the relative The first-order condition for capital employment re-
cost of energy is larger than the short-run effect. Similar quires: In k = in ~ + In y — In pa. In the short-run
computations indicate that the long-run reduction in en- (d in Ic = 0), a decline in output is reflected in an equal
ergy usage and the decline in the real wage rate of labor percentage decline in the real value of capital, Pa The long-
are also larger than in the short nui. The increased size run results reqmured in P 0, so dIn Ic = d In y. Substitut-
of the long-run effects arises from the reduction of capital ing the expression for In k in (2) and differentiating with re-
employment through a temporary reduction In investment. dI ny d In k y
- spect to in p results in -- = —-—-—— = — —, given
For the particular case of a Cobb-Douglas production di np0 dI np0 a
function, the model is even simpler. The production func- Pa and h. The implied long-run decline in the real wage
tion is y = ~ kfl eT, where a, 3, -y are the respective din Pa ) is also (~-~7~), given labor employment and the
output elasticities of the inputs: labor, capital, and energy d In p. a
and they sum to one. The term A is a scale factor; a rate real price ofcapital.
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